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Congress, the Deficit, 
and Budget Reconciliation 
RICHARD DOYLE 
President Clinton's veto of the 1995 reconciliation bill, the largest and most ambitious 
such legislation ever passed by Congress, was the first time a reconciliation bill was 
ever rejected by a president. It was also the first reconciliation bill in two decades to 
include a tax reduction rather than a tax increase. The fate of this bill, and its scope 
and contents, suggest the need to assess the evolution of reconciliation within the 
congressional budget process. In the early 1980s, Congress altered budget reconcilia-
tion procedures, putting in place a powerful new capability for deficit reduction. 
Reconciliation became the primary means within the budget process of restraining 
entitlement spending and increasing taxes as part of congressional efforts to reduce the 
deficit. Gramm-Rudman-Hollings magnified certain problems Congress encountered 
in using reconciliation to control entitlements, producing increased pressure to cut 
discretionary spending. While the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990 included new 
authority to use reconciliation to restrain entitlements, congressional spending priori-
ties combined with the Peace Dividend to maintain the relative sanctuary entitlement 
programs have enjoyed. The limits of reconciliation as a deficit reduction tool, both in 
terms of increasing revenues and curtailing entitlements, are detailed. The inherent 
procedural advantages accorded to entitlements are contrasted with the treatment of 
discretionary programs, explaining in part the widening gulf between these two cat-
egories of spending. Congress has attempted, without success, to find alternatives to 
reconciliation. The failure of the seven-year, deficit-eliminating reconciliation bill of 
1995 may indicate that certain limits on the use of reconciliation may have been 
reached. 
INTRODUCTION 
Spanning seven years and promising to completely eliminate the federal deficit rather 
than simply reduce it, the 19,95 version of reconciliation had the potential to be the 
"mother of all reconciliation pills." Relying heavily on major cuts in Medicare, one of 
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the most popular entitlement programs in the budget, the 1995 reconciliation bill also 
included, for the first time in the history of reconciliation, a major tax cut as one of its 
provisions. Another first for a reconciliation bill was achieved when the bill was 
vetoed by the President. These events suggest that certain dynamics associated with 
budget reconciliation may have run their course, setting the stage for recasting the role 
of reconciliation in the budget process. 
Reconciliation became a major element in budgeting in 1995, as it will be in the 
near future, as a result of three developments. The first of these was the near passage 
of the constitutional balanced budget amendment in the spring of 1995, before Con-
gress took up the budget resolution. The amendment passed the House with more than 
the necessary two-thirds majority, but was stopped short in the Senate by a single 
vote. 1 This vote underlines the strength of the mandate for deficit elimination. Recon-
ciliation will be critical to this end, either as a major implementing device supporting a 
future balanced budget amendment or, as in 1995, as the primary legislative vehicle for 
implementing a budget resolution calling for• deficit elimination. 
The anticipated return of the deficit is the second development of significance. 
Congress and t~e Administration made noticeable progress in reducing the deficit in 
the early 1990s, whether the deficit is considered absolutely or as a percentage of the 
GDP. 1996 was the fourth straight year in which the deficit declined. According to the 
Congressional Budget Office (CBO), the deficit dropped from $290.4 billion and 4.7 
percent of GDP in FY1992 to $116 billion and 1.5 percent of GDP in FY1996. 
Ho,wever, CBO forecasts issued during 1996 indicated that the deficit would begin to 
grow again in FY 1997, and to expand noticeably over the next decade. The deficit was 
estimated to be $402 billion and 3.3 percent of GDP by 2006.2 Both a Democratic 
president and a Republican majority in Congress came to agree in 1995 that the deficit 
must be eliminated, their major differences centering initially on the number of years 
needed to accomplish this fiscal feat, but finally, and more importantly, on the precise 
spending and revenue mix to be imposed to zero the deficit. 
The underlying cause of the projected growth in the deficit is the third development 
inviting attention to reconciliation. "Growing deficits," CBO reports, "stem from en-
titlement spending, particularly the major health care programs."3 If rising deficits 
driven by entitlement spending are the problem, reconciliation has been the prescribed 
congressional procedure for imposing solutions.4 However, the problem may have 
become too unwieldy to be resolved with a single reconciliation bill. 
Reconciliation in 1995 was the most fiscally far-reaching of all reconciliation bills 
passed to date. The budget resolution included reconciliation instructions calling for 
more than $626 billion in entitlement cuts over seven years, averaging nearly $90 
billion per year.5 By comparison, the total first year impact of all entitlement cuts in 
all reconciliation bills passeµ between 1981 and 1991 is just over $90 billion.6 The 
sheer scope of the bill, the uncertain impact of the Medicare and Medicaid cuts and the 
fact that it also included a major tax cut were among the major factors explaining the 
presidential veto and the budget impasse that followed. 
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The extraordinary nature of reconciliation in 1995 should not obscure the conflicts 
and problems that have characterized the evolution of this important set of procedures. 
Reconciliation was one of the first and most important modifications of the congres-
sional budget process originally established in 1974 (see Figure 1). It became vital to 
congressional budgeting during the 1980s and 1990s, a period dominated by record 
deficits and repeated efforts to reverse this trend. Congress made little progress in 
reducing the deficit in the 1980s, but made some headway through the mid-1990s. 
The congressional record with respect to procedure and its impact on deficit reduc-
tion is explained in part by the fact that what Congress does reasonably well--control-
ling discretionary spending-has become increasingly marginal to deficit reduction. 
Congress has been less effective in curbing entitlement spending and raising taxes, the 
typical objectives of reconciliation. Budget reconciliation has not yet provided the 
political traction necessary to level the playing field among the spending and revenue 
elements that determine budget outcomes. 
There is no pretense here that a procedure such as reconciliation can resolve the 
fundamental policy and political problems thought to account for persistent deficits. 
Budget outcomes are determined by a complex of variables, notably the spending and 
taxing preferences of presidents and members of Congress and the state of the 
economy. For example, the reluctance of elected officials to cut popular entitlement 
programs or raise taxes is rooted in the notion that voters will not support such 
policies. 
Furthermore, the very concept of an entitlement is, to some extent, logically incon-
sistent with a budget process intended to review programs and make adjustments each 
year. To the contrary, the essence of entitlement programs is "the absence of annual 
decisions on funding levels."7 Entitlements represent open-ended promises made to 
citizens by the government. As Schick notes, "If Congress wants to control through 
annual appropriations, it cannot provide a genuine entitlement; if it wants to provide 
beneficiaries with secure payment, it cannot determine the amounts to be spent through 
the appropriations process."8 Wildavsky put it even more bluntly: "budgeting and 
entitlement are incompatible concepts."9 
Nonetheless, the same electoral calculus that discourages votes against entitlement 
cuts and tax increases encourages elected officials to pledge support for deficit reduc-
tion and balanced budgets, to be realized through constitutional amendments or other-
wise, e.g., reconciliation. Procedure can assist legislators in integrating such conflict-
ing policy goals. That is one of the justifications offered for the use of reconciliation. 10 
But the budget process rules addressing reconciliation have proved problematic, result-
ing in intensified pressure to reduce discretionary spending as deficits continued to 
grow. 
This article examines the employment of reconciliation as one of several procedural 
means available to CongressJor deficit reduction. The original purpose of reconcilia-
tion and its transformation into a major budget policy tool are described first. The 
implications of Gramm-Rudman-Hollings and the Budget Enforcement Act are then 
examined, followed by an assessment of significant and recurring problems associated 
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Sources: Congressional Budget Office, Reducing the Deficit: Spending and Revenue Options, Aug. 1996. Projections for the period FY9~5 assume that 
discretionary spending grows with inflation. Savings from the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 are not included. 
with implementing reconciliation. Attempts to supplement or circumvent reconcilia-
tion by changing the procedures for entitlement budgeting are noted. This background 
informs an evaluation of reconciliation during the l 04th Congress ( 1995-96) and the 
lessons it holds for the role of reconciliation in the deficit reduction enterprise. 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF RECONCILIATION 
Budget reconciliation is inherently complex. Under the Congressional Budget Act of 
1974 (CBA), the original purpose of reconciliation was to implement the spending and 
tax policy decisions agreed to in the final or binding congressional budget resolution. 11 
During the early period under the CBA, Congress passed multiple budget resolutions, 
the first establishing targets for spending and revenue, while the final version (usually 
the second) set binding ceilings for spending and floors for revenues. Reconciliation 
was to be used to implement the final, binding resolution. Reconciliation could be used 
to adjust any and all kinds of federal spending for this purpose. 
The problem with this approach was timing. The use of multiple budget resolutions 
required Congress to vote twice in a single year on "awful aggregates."12 Worse, the 
second budget resolution solution, to be implemented through reconciliation, had to be 
completed by September 15, just fifteen days before the beginning of the next fiscal 
year. All of the problems embedded in program cuts and tax increases were com-
pounded by requiring significant changes at the end of a fiscal year, which was also 
frequently just before an election. 
THE TRANSFORMATION OF RECONCILIATION 
Congress dispensed with multiple budget resolutions, first in practice and then by law, 
which ameliorated but did not completely resolve the timing issue. 13 The first and only 
budget resolution, the deadline for which is April 15, is now the starting point for 
reconciliation. Simultaneously, reconciliation came to focus upon a single important 
category of federal spending, i.e., entitlements. 14 
Reconciliation and the Budget Resolution 
Reconciliation occurs as the result of two sets of decisions. The first is agreement by 
congressional majorities to combine entitlement spending reductions and tax increases 
with cuts in discretionary programs as part of a deficit reduction package. This agree-
ment incorporated in the budget resolution is frequently, though not always, the result 
of budget summits. 15 It may ·emerge, as in 1993, from bargaining on budget totals 
involving the President, congryssional leadership, the parties and ideological coalitions 
within Congress. In 1995, the reconciliation bill passed by Congress and vetoed by 
President Clinton was the product of Republican party control in Congress and the 
commitment of that party's leadership to deficit elimination within seven years. Sum-
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mitry followed President Clinton's December 6 veto of reconciliation, rather than 
preceding its passage as in previous years. 
Reconciliation in 1996 was completed without a summit. The 1996 budget resolu-
tion called for a rolling, three part reconciliation process. The first bill was to address 
Medicaid and welfare, the second, Medicare, and the third, a large tax cut. Of the 
three, only part of the first was completed. The resulting bill, the Personal Responsibil-
ity and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, focused exclusively on welfare 
reform. 
Reconciliation begins with instructions in the budget resolution directed to the 
committees with jurisdiction over the entitlement programs and taxes targeted for 
adjustment. Committees are instructed to make changes in statutory law, in the form of 
spending cuts or tax increases, as necessary to produce the net deficit reduction, or 
budgetary savings, stipulated in the instructions. The resolution does not indicate how 
the targets are to be achieved, that is, which programs are to be cut or which taxes are 
to be raised to meet the overall targets given 'to the committees. 
The Politics of Reconciliation Legislation 
The second set of decisions associated with reconciliation encompasses the politics of 
the bill comprised of all of the legislative adjustments offered by the committees 
identified in the resolution instructions. The House and Senate Budget Committees 
compile the statutory proposals reported out by these committees into a single omnibus 
reconciliation bill. As with other legislation, each chamber develops its own version of 
reconciliation, operating under the parameters set by the budget resolution. Governed 
by special rules to ensure timely passage and to safeguard the deficit reduction they are 
intended to achieve, reconciliation bills are subject to floor and conference committee 
debate, amendment and approval before final passage and presidential consideration. 
Timely action on reconciliation legislation remains a problem, as contemporary 
(post-1980) reconciliation bills still come late. When reconciliation instructions were 
included in budget resolutions, those resolutions were usually passed two months or 
more beyond the April 15 deadline. The average time between passage of the budget 
resolution and enactment of reconciliation is 148 days. Most of this time (about 60 
percent) was used to get the reconciliation bills through the House and Senate. The 
remaining time was needed to complete the conference agreement. 16 Congressional 
action on the vetoed 1995 reconciliation bill was not completed until November 17, 
more than six weeks into fiscal year 1996 and more than five months past the June 15 
deadline Congress has set for completion of reconciliation. 
Reconciliation enables Congress to consider all spending, as well as tax increases, 
on a more or less equal basi~ as means to the end of deficit reduction. The larger the 
share of deficit reduction assigned in the budget resolution to entitlement cuts and tax 
increases in relation to discretionary spending cuts, the more important reconciliation 
becomes. If the tax increases and entitlement spending cuts contemplated by the reso-
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TABLE 1 
Deficit Reduction from Reconciliation, 1980-19968 
(Total budgetary savings from entitlement cuts and tax increases, 
in billions of then-year dollars) 
Years Covered by 
Deficit Reduction Reconciliation Bill 
1980 8.2 l 
1981 130.l 3 
1982 129.l 3 
1984 63.0 3 
1986 29.9 3 
1987 39.6 2 
1989 14.7 1 
1990 233.3 5 
1993 317.5 5 
1995 626b 1 
1996 54.5 6 
• The important exception to this table is the savings achieved through the caps placed on discretionary spending 
in 1990, extended in 1993 and 1995. These caps, which accounted for another $190 billion in savings in 1990 and 
$69 billion in 1993, became law as part of reconciliation bills. 
b This is the amount of deficit reduction that would have occurred had the original reconciliation bill passed by 
Congress and vetoed by President Clinton become law. 
Sources: Cloud and Hager 1993, 1066-67,CBO,ReducingtheDeficit 1994,5, 7,CBO, TheEconomicandBudget 
Outlook: An Update 1995, 36, and CBO Federal Budget Effects ofH.R. 3734, The Personal Responsibility 
and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996. 
lution are to be realized, the committees with jurisdiction over these programs must be 
persuaded to act. But the fiscal policy represented by the budget resolution is not self-
implementing; procedural obstacles, including some associated with reconciliation, 
frequently limit its achievement. 
Congress passed the first successful reconciliation bill targeting both entitlement 
spending and taxes in 1980.17,However, the real political debut of reconciliation as a 
budget policy device was the 1981 reconciliation bill. It was orchestrated by David 
Stockman, President Reagan's Director of 0MB, Senator Domenici, then (as now) the 
new Chairman of the Senate Budget Committee, and Republicans and "boll weevil" 
Democrats in the House.18 Stockman's observation that the administration and its 
supporters in Congress "wanted something big and new and rolling fast to break down 
parochial resistance" conveys the shift in the scope and purpose of reconciliation that 
took place that year. 19 
Reconciliation became a inore or less regular and extremely factious aspect of 
congressional budgeting in the 1980s and early 1990s (see Table 1). In eleven of the 
sixteen years between 1980 and 1996, reconciliation instructions were included in the 
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congressional budget resolution, and in each of those years budget reconciliation bills 
were passed.20 While the CBA originally provided for reconciliation bills that covered 
a single year, the timeframe has been extended. Tl_lree-year reconciliation bills were 
the norm in the 1980s, five-year bills were passed in 1990 and 1993, and a six-year bill 
passed in 1996. The seven-year, deficit elimination reconciliation bill passed in 1995 
and vetoed by the President is the most comprehensive to date. 
THE IMPACT OF GRAMM-RUDMAN-HOLLINGS: 
SEQUESTRATION VERSUS RECONCILIATION 
The Gramm-Rudman-Hollings (GRH) chapter in budgeting (1985-90), presented a 
special set of problems for reconciliation. The GRH bills (GRH I in 1985 and GRH II 
in 1987) set specific deficit targets that Congress was obliged to meet. These targets 
were designed to eliminate the defidt, by 1990 in GRH I, extended to 1993 in GRH IL 
While it would appear that reconciliation would be the natural ally of this approach to 
budgeting, events and incentives produced a different outcome. 
GRH magnified the limitations of reconciliation and exacerbated the procedural 
advantage entitlements enjoyed over discretionary programs. This was a consequence 
of the fact that those opposing entitlement cuts or tax hikes could prevent them from 
being implemented through delaying tactics. Delay was possible because of the man-
ner in which GRH enforced procedures for hitting its deficit targets, i.e., sequestratio11. 
If Congress was unable to meet the GRH deficit target for a given year through its 
regular budget procedures, including reconciliation, a sequester was required. But 
these across-the-board spending cuts were, by law, targeted overwhelmingly on discre-
tionary spending, as almost all entitlement programs were exempted by statute.21 
The GRH sequester mechanism meant that time was on the side of those who 
resisted reconciliation and the entitlement cuts and tax increases it required. If recon-
ciliation bills were kept in committee long enough, a sequester cutting discretionary 
spending would be triggered. In this manner the tax increases and entitlement spending 
cuts stipulated in the budget resolution as necessary to hit the GRH target would no 
longer be needed for that purpose. Instead, the entire burden of deficit reduction could 
be shifted to discretionary spending. Under such circumstances, reconciliation delayed 
was reconciliation denied. 
Utider GRH, sequestration and reconciliation were antithetical propositions. The 
former reduced the deficit primarily by cutting discretionary spending. The latter is 
used when tax hikes and entitlement spending cuts are to be combined with discretion-
ary spending for the same purpose. Forcing sequestration by delaying reconciliation 
allowed the committees with jurisdiction over entitlement programs and taxes to shift 
the burden of deficit reduction to discretionary spending, the province of the Appro-
priations Committees. ' 
The Chairman of the House Appropriations Committee, where discretionary appro-
priations bills originate each year, reacted bitterly to this practice: "So long as segues-
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ter remains the method of first and last resort to reach deficit reduction targets, the 
natural reaction of authorization committees instructed to make painful cuts in their 
[entitlement] programs is to punt and let sequester inflict the pain elsewhere."22 
THE IMPACT OF THE BUDGET ENFORCEMENT ACT: 
GRANDFAT.HERING THE ENTITLEMENT BASELINE 
With passage of the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990 (BEA), Congress apparently 
began a new era in budgeting.23 The BEA signaled a shift from deficit reduction 
mandated by enumerated deficit targets-the GRH tactic-to an indirect approach 
called spending control. But in terms of the allocation of deficit reduction between 
entitlements and discretionary spending and the role of reconciliation, the impact of 
the BEA has been nominal. The BEA simply made explicit the same _budget policy 
preferences characteristic of the pre-BEA period. 
Until 1995, deficit reduction under BEA~mandated spending control has been ac-
complished through a combination of spending restraint and tax increases. Spending 
restraint, in turn, has consisted primarily of discretionary spending cuts, concentrated 
on defense. The allocation of budgetary savings realized in the five-year deficit reduc-
tion bills enacted in 1990 and 1993 illustrates the point. The two bills were credited by 
CBO with a total of $915 billion in deficit reduction. Tax increases accounted for $399 
billion, or 44 percent. Discretionary spending was credited with $259 billion, or 28 
percent of total savings, because these reconciliation bills incorporated and then ex-
tended and lowered the BEA spending caps. The savings achieved from entitlement 
cuts was $136 billion, or 15 percent, about half the amount contributed by discretion-
ary cuts and one-third of the tax increases. The entitlement savings were slightly 
greater than the savings generated by reduced payments for debt service ($106 billion 
and 12 percent).24 
The savings achieved in discretionary spending under the BEA have been imple-
mented through a series of statutory caps set at levels below the conventional baseline 
for discretionary spending, i.e., the previous year's level plus inflation. For the first 
three years under the BEA (FY 1991-93), separate caps were set for defense, domestic 
and international discretionary spending: There were also caps on total discretionary 
spending, originally set to expire in FY 1995, later extended through FY 1998. The 
1995 and 1996 budget resolutions restored separate caps, this time dividing discretion-
ary spending between defense and non-defense.25 However, in both instances the sepa-
ration was contingent upon completion of reconciliation. 
During the first three years of separate caps, all deficit reduction from discretionary 
spending came from the defense budget.26 Congress went beyond the deficit reduction 
required by the caps by appr9priating below them in two of the first three years under 
the BEA. Again, defense spending was the target, accounting for $19.5 billion, or 82 
percent, of a total of $23.8 billion in discretionary savings beyond what was required 
by the BEA caps.27 
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Spending control for entitlement programs under the BEA has another meaning. 
The only requirement is that Congress avoid exacerbating the deficit by adding new 
entitlement programs that are not paid for according to the BEA formula. CBO notes, 
"Rejecting a decade of complaints from some quarters about the growth of entitlement 
spending, the new law [BEA] allows entitlements to be increased without limit, as long 
as the increases are paid fq_r by new taxes or fees."28 
The BEA also included some statutory changes to reconciliation procedures that 
could provide the Budget Committees increased leverage to enforce reconciliation 
instructions. Under a special process, the Senate Budget Committee is given new 
authority to substitute its own spending cuts if the committees targeted in the Senate 
reconciliation instructions fail to comply.29 The House Budget Committee is allowed 
to introduce a "reconciliation directive in the form of a concurrent resolution."30 This 
n~w resolution would require revenue increases should the deficit-neutral rule affect-
ing taxes and entitlements be broken. Finally, the BEA strengthened the Byrd Rule and 
extended its applicability to the House.31 
To implement spending control, the BEA includes an elaborate new sequester 
mechanism.32 These sequesters are designed to enforce limits on both types of spend-
ing. On the discretionary side, the BEA requires "mini sequesters'' if Congress appro-
priates above the caps, and two extremely small mini sequesters have been enforced.33 
The entitlement sequester is designed to enforce the PA YGO approach to entitle-
ments. A PA YGO sequester is triggered by new entitlement spending that has not been 
offset by either tax increases or cuts in existing entitlements. A PA YGO sequester 
would reduce existing entitlements to pay for new ones. The BEA also modified 
slightly the list of entitlement programs subject to sequester under GRH. However, the 
only notable change to this list is to allow Medicare payments to providers to be cut up 
to 4 percent, as compared to 2 percent under GRH.34 
PAYGO essentially codifies legislative policy in effect since the mid-1980s, that is, 
the assumption that Congress cannot afford to create new entitlement programs unless 
it can offset their costs.35 The BEA sequester rules converted this policy into law and 
put new entitlement programs, formally and legally, into a zero sum relationship with 
existing entitlement program~. More importantly, sequestration of either discretionary 
or entitlement spending is now linked to the BEA spending controls rather than deficit 
targets as under GRH. Those controls, until 1995, have relied upon discretionary 
spending, especially defense, for deficit reduction, while the allowable deficit is ad-
justed to accommodate growth in spending for existing entitlements. 
The combination of moving deficit targets and protection for existing entitlement 
programs minimizes incentives to restrain the growth of entitlement spending. Not 
only is there little inducement to propose reforms, there is reason to expect supporters 
of the more "exposed" discr~tionary programs to attempt to "entitle" the beneficiaries 
of this spending.36 This is a 'natural result of the fact that under the BEA, the baseline 
for entitlement spending is protected, while the baseline for discretionary spending 
declines. In _effect, spending for en.titlement programs under the BEA has no ceiling, 
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and spending for discretionary programs, such as defense, has no floor. As a result, the 
procedural sanctuary provided to entitlement programs has been reinforced and the gap 
between spending for discretionary programs and entitlements has widened. 
There have been no PAY GO sequesters to date and the new authority granted to the 
Budget Committees with respect to reconciliation remains unused. That is because the 
BEA does not significantly change the incentives affecting reconciliation. By substitut-
ing spending control for deficit reduction as the primary focus of congressional budget 
policy, the BEA ratified the notion of a peace dividend, i.e., anticipation that defense 
budgets can be substantially reduced now that the Cold War is over. This expectation 
has been realized, as real defense spending dropped 25 percent between 1990 and 1995 
and the savings have been applied against the deficit.37 
Spending control through defense cuts bought Congress some time in the struggle 
against the deficit. However, these cuts were insufficient to offset the results of the 
recession, the savings and loan bailout and the growth in entitlement spending. While 
adhering to the discretionary ·spending caps and PA YOO, Congress sought further 
deficit reduction-in fact, deficit elimination-in 1995 and 1996. 
The 1995 budget resolution represented two important departures from the trends 
evident under the BEA with respect to treatment of entitlements and discretionary 
spending. First, entitlements accounted for the lion's share of savings under the resolu-
tion. Entitlement program reductions, meaning reduced rates of growth in projected 
spending, would have supplied 70 percent of the deficit reduction needed to balance 
the budget by 2002.38 Discretionary spending cuts contributed only 15 percent (with 
savings from reduced debt service making up another 15 percent).39 
The second major departure was the composition of the discretionary cuts. While 
discretionary spending caps were extended and lowered, defense was no longer ex-
pected to supply the necessary savings. Defense spending would increase in nominal 
dollars under the new caps, though it would remain 17 percent below what would be 
needed to keep pace with inflation. Non-defense discretionary spending, however, 
drops precipitously, by 10 percent in nominal dollars and 30 percent when inflation is 
considered.40 The 1996 resolution also demanded more cuts from entitlements than 
from discretionary spending, ~ut the difference narrowed considerably. A smaller tax 
cut (reducing the size of the necessary spending offsets) made smaller entitlement cuts 
possible, and the resistance Republicans encountered in 1995 in defending their larger 
Medicare cuts made them necessary. 
THE LIMITATIONS OF RECONCILIATION: MAINTAINING REVENUES 
In 1975, operating under the original, multiple budget resolution format described 
above, Congress used reconciliation to expedite a tax reduction. Between 1975 and 
1995, Congress took a differbnt tack, attempting to raise taxes through reconciliation 
as part of an effort to reduce the deficit. The first problem confronting Congress in this 
effort was the fragmentation of tax policy under the CBA. 
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Reconciliation is a relatively new vehicle for legislating tax policy. It was imposed 
upon an established system for considering tax bills developed in Congress over many 
decades, a system with its own political and procedural logic. This pre-existing system, 
the locus of which was the House Ways and Means Committee and the Senate Finance 
Committee, "functioned as a virtually self-contained component of the legislative pro-
cess."41 While the Budget Act generally assumes that deficits are the product of both 
spending and taxing decisions, it has been only partially successful in replacing the 
older, residual system with a more comprehensive approach integrating tax bills with 
budget resolutions and reconciliation. 
Tax increases were part of every reconciliation bill passed by Congress since 1980, 
with three exceptions. The first of these was the 1981 reconciliation bill, which in-
cluded no tax increases. In fact, Congress passed and President Reagan signed separate 
legislation that year reducing taxes by an amount larger than the spending cuts in the 
reconciliation bill.42 The other two occurred in 1995, when major tax reductions were 
actually included in the 1995 and 1996 budget resolutions as part of the reconciliation 
instructions (see below). However, the 1995 tax cut was part of the reconciliation bill 
President Clinton vetoed and the 1996 reconciliation bill, which did become law, cut 
welfare benefits rather than taxes. 
Even under the common practice whereby reconciliation instructions called for tax 
increases, both Congress and the executive branch have supported tax cuts at odds 
with the deficit reduction policy established by the budget resolution. In the 1970s and 
1980s, such tax cuts, disconnected from the budget process, took more money out of 
the Treasury than was put in by the tax increases in reconciliation.43 
Tax policy, which is the net effect of revenue bills passed pursuant to the budget 
resolution as well as those outside the budget process, deviates from and frequently 
confounds budget policy, which is the revenue assumptions in the budget resolution to 
be implemented by reconciliation. This occurs for several reasons. One source of 
deviation is the view that cutting taxes is a rudimentary means of controlling the size 
of government. If big budgets mean big government then smaller budgets, the result of 
reduced revenues, may induce smaller government. This is the "children's allowance 
theory" articulated by President Reagan in his 1981 state of the economy speech.44 
Tax policy may also deviate from budget policy when taxes are treated as a form of 
expenditure. "Tax expenditures," Havemann observes, "can be regarded as the tax 
code's equivalent of direct federal spending."45 As political currency, tax preferences 
may be particularly attractive to lawmakers and their constituents when spending is 
constrained by deficits or by spending control measures such as the BEA caps. 
There was no congressional schizophrenia on tax policy in 1995 and 1996. Instead 
of raising taxes through the regular budget process (i.e., the budget resolution and 
reconciliation) while cutting them outside it, Congress incorporated a major tax reduc-
tion in the budget resolution both years and in 1995 and implemented the cut through 
reconciliation. The 1995 tax cut, according to a Republican economist, was the 
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TABLE2 
Discretionary and Entitlement Spending, 1975-2005 
( outlays in billions of current dollars) 
1975 1985 1995 
Entitlements -169.1 450.4 839.4 
%ofGDP 10.9 11.0 11.7 
% of Total Spending 50.9 47.6 55.3 
Discretionary 157.8 415.7 545.7 
%ofGDP 10.2 10.1 7.6 








Sources: CBO, The Economic and Budget Outlook: Fiscal Years 1997-2006, January 1995 and The Economic and 
Budget Outlook: An Update, August 1995. 
Novocain necessary to dull the pain of the massive spending cuts enacted to reduce the 
deficit. 46 The 1996 tax cut did not materialize. 
While the implementation process was complex, the logic was straightforward. 47 
The key was the fiscal dividend anticipated if all of the spending cuts contained in the 
reconciliation bill were achieved. If CBO certified that these spending cuts were suffi-
cient to balance the budget by 2002, additional savings-the fiscal dividend-would 
occur. The dividend would consist of increased government revenues generated by 
higher economic growth rates and lower federal interest payments on the debt. In both 
cases, the savings would derive from the lower interest rates CBO expected from a 
balanced budget. 
While the President's 1995 budget also assumed tax cuts and a fiscal dividend, the 
congressional budget resolution included a much larger cut. It called for a $245 billion 
reduction in revenues, a sum larger than the $182 billion in Medicaid savings and 
nearly equal to the $270 billion in Medicare savings. While the economic logic of the 
tax cuts was clear, its political logic was less convincing. The President and congres-
sional Democrats severely criticized the tax cut in the budget resolution, arguing that it 
was the reason for the significant cuts in programs such as Medicaid and Medicare. 
THE LIMITATIONS OF RECONCILIATION: CONTAINING ENTITLEMENTS 
Two kinds of difficulties confront reconciliation on the spending side, where the goal 
is to reduce the deficit by restraining the growth of entitlement programs. The first is 
inertia and the second is the vµlnerability of reconciliation to co-optation. The inertia 
problem arises from the fact that the budgetary status quo both shelters entitlements 
from spending cuts and favors increased spending for them. The co-optation problem 
arises once the status quo is overcome and reconciliation is initiated to reduce entitle-
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ment spending. Before examining these problems, a brief review of recent and pro-
jected spending for entitlement and discretionary programs is in order. 
The Emergence of the Entitlement-Discretionary Spending Gap 
The most dramatic surge in entitlement spending took place between 1966 and 1976, 
when it jumped from 30 percent of the budget to 51 percent.48 The newly established 
health care programs (Medicare and Medicaid) plus expansions in Social Security 
benefits accounted for most of this increase. Entitlement spending first exceeded dis-
cretionary spending in 1974, the year Congress adopted the CBA. The gap has contin-
ued to widen, driven by rapid increases in entitlement spending. Pending major shifts 
in budget policy, entitlement spending is projected to grow at an average annual rate of 
6.8 percent for the remainder of thi$ decade. Discretionary spending will grow at 3.4 
percent per year during this period, half the rate of increase for entitlements. 49 From 55 
percent of total spending in i 995, entitlements will account for 62 percent within ten 
years.50 (See Table 2.) 
These structural changes in federal spending are symbolized by a milestone passed 
in 1993. That year, Social Security, the largest entitlement program, exceeded defense, 
the largest discretionary program, as the largest single spending program in the federal 
budget.51 
The composition of federal spending shifted at least in part as a consequence of 
differences in the means available to Congress to set spending levels for the two 
categories of spending. The budget process incorporates an explicit bias toward entitle-
ment programs and against discretionary spending. The result is that entitlement 
spending is subject to continuous aggregation, while discretionary spending is subject 
to continuous negotiation. The policy priorities that have shaped this environment 
place limits upon the effectiveness of reconciliation. 
Procedural Inertia: Entitlements at Rest Remaining at Rest 
Entitlement programs exist by virtue of statutes guaranteeing payments to beneficia-
ries. 52 If Congress does nothing regarding these statutes in the course of the budget 
process, i.e., passage of reconciliation, the spending they generate continues. For dis-
cretionary programs, the reverse is true. Absent legislative action in the form of budget 
resolutions and authorization and appropriations bills, discretionary programs are not 
funded. 
Procedural Inertia: Entitlements in Motion Remaining in Motion 
Entitlement programs enjoy more than the relative advantage of the legislative status 
quo. Annual spending increases are generated by cost of living allowances (COLAs) 
and other indexing provisions written into entitlement statutes. By the beginning of the 
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1980s, half of federal spending was directly or indirectly linked to the Consumer Price 
Index or some other economic barometer, the bulk of which was comprised of entitle-
ments. 53 
The momentum of entitlement spending is best captured by examining the elements 
that account for the entitlement baseline. CBO projects an increase of $780 billion for 
that baseline between 1996--and 2006. Of this amount, 39 percent is attributed to 
increases in Medicare and Medicaid unrelated to caseloads or automatic increases in 
reimbursement rates, 21 percent to COLAs and 18 percent to increases in caseloads for 
all entitlements.54 
Looking Where the Light is Good: Cutting Discretionary Spending 
The procedural inertia characteristic of entitlement programs is less evident in the 
treatment of discretionary programs. These programs must receive new resources ev-
ery year through the budget process. For these programs, at least two of the three 
iterations of the budget process-the budget resolution, authorizing legislation and 
appropriations-must be successfully negotiated every year. Discretionary programs 
with multi-year authorizations are not at risk during this phase of the budget process; 
defense, subject to annual authorizations, must always compete in all three phases. 
Programs that do not succeed at every stage where funding is considered are in jeop-
ardy. Advocates of deficit reduction are offered numerous opportunities to reduce 
discretionary spending. 
Discretionary programs face an additional challenge from the rescission process. 
Funds which have been appropriated but not yet used may be canceled, or rescinded, 
as the result of a presidential proposal and congressional approval. Between 1974 and 
1987, presidents proposed rescissions in excess of $58 billion, of which Congress 
approved $19.7 billion, or about one-third.55 In 1992 alone, President Bush requested 
$7.9 billion in discretionary spending rescissions, and Congress approved the full 
amount and $300 million more.56 In 1995, Congress rescinded $11.8 billion, the larg-
est bill of its kind ever passed.57 These "reverse appropriations bills" target discretion-
ary programs exclusively. 
Coopting Reconciliation 
As "must pass" legislation, reconciliation has become the target for proposals unre-
lated to, or at odds with, deficit reduction. Measures increasing spending for health 
care programs have been particularly noticeable in this regard. Of the seven expan-
sions of Medicaid between 1984 and 1990, for example, six were put into effect by 
virtue of their attachment to teconciliation bills.58 While congressional tax policy, as 
noted above, frequently supersedes reconciliation, entitlement policy resists and cor-
rupts it. 
The Budget Committees, as ostensible guardians of the integrity of the budget 
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resolution, found themselves in a constant and frequently losing struggle to prevent the 
co-optation of reconciliation. Reconciliation bills may fail to achieve their deficit 
reduction objectives in part because of the limited power wielded by the Budget 
Committees over their content. The Budget Committees are not permitted to substan-
tively revise the language submitted by committees targeted for entitlement cuts or tax 
increases in the resolution. They must, Schick notes, use "pressure and persuasion to 
get recalcitrant committees to produce cutback legislation."59 
The reconciliation process of 1989 illustrates this problem. The Senate Budget 
Committee was compelled to report out an FY 1990 reconciliation bill cutting some 
agricultural subsidies, but also adding some new ones. Senator Gramm observed, this 
bill "that strikes eggplants and inserts eggplants, kiwi fruit, nectarines and plums, is a 
very far cry from the seriousness that everybody claims to have about reducing the 
deficits."60 
The House version of reconciliation in 1989, referred to by the Washington Post as 
"Wreckonciliation," containeo even more provisions increasing rather than decreasing 
the deficit.61 Supported by the Administration, Congress, or both, these provisions 
included programs addressing drug use, child-care, medical care for the poor, cata-
strophic health-care protection for the elderly, drought relief for farmers, aid to Poland 
and Hungary, a space mission to Mars, a crackdown on crime and a bailout for ailing 
savings and loan institutions.62 
When the Senate took up reconciliation that year, Senator Domenici, the ranking 
Republican on the Senate Budget Committee, submitted a list of extraneous provisions 
in the House bill. These provisions were either irrelevant to spending or taxing or they 
increased the former or decreased the latter, in which case they defeated the purpose of 
reconciliation. Domenici cited 156 such provisions in the House reconciliation bill.63 
Senator Jim Sasser, Chairman of the Senate Budget Committee, complained that the 
reconciliation bill "has become the vehicle for virtually everything but deficit reduc-
tion."64 
There were no major co-optation problems in the 1995 reconciliation bill. It was 
anticipated that committees instructed to report reconciliation legislation to the Budget 
Committees would need more time than in an ordinary year, given the size and nature 
of the spending and tax cuts. While some of the changes to the health care programs 
reflected controversial policy and questionable assumptions about patient or provider 
behavior, there were no noticeable or successful attempts in 1995 to incorporate pro-
gram increases into legislation designed to make program cuts. 
THE FUTILE SEARCH FOR AN ALTERNATIVE TO RECONCILIATION 
Reconciliation, or other legislative procedures that effectively join tax increases or 
(more likely) entitlement reductions to other deficit reduction measures, will remain 
important as Congress continues to grapple with the fiscal consequences of the escala-
tion of entitlement spending and its impact on the deficit. At the same time, however, 
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efforts continue to find or fashion procedures that might alleviate the need to imple-
ment reconciliation and thereby avoid the politics that it entails. 
Entitlement Caps 
In December, 1991, the House Budget Committee, then chaired by Leon Panetta, 
issued a report indicating the urgent need to control entitlement spending.65 The report 
included a recommendation to establish a cap on entitlement spending.66 The Senate 
actually debated-and defeated-a similar proposal as part of its deliberations on the 
budget resolution in 1992,67 and the Bush Administration endorsed entitlement caps in 
its FY 1993 budget proposal. 68 
Caps on entitlements presume agreement on the programs to be cut and the size of 
the cuts. This is the same set of problems engaged when Congress decides in the 
budget resolution that reconciFation will be necessary to include entitlement cuts as 
part of total deficit reduction. The prospec't of employing entitlement caps simply 
returns Congress to the underlying budget and policy problems, as evidenced by the 
Senate experience in 1992. 
Entitlement Review 
Another alternative is the innocuous "entitlement review process" adopted by the 
House. Citing concern for "our ability to project, monitor and pay for rising health care 
costs" and other entitlement programs, the House enacted an entitlement review pro-
cess in 1993 and renewed it in 1994.69 This process required the President to set 
targets for entitlement spending. If 0MB estimated that entitlement spending would 
exceed these targets, the President would be required to either recommend offsets 
(spending cuts or tax increases) or an adjustment of the targets. The House, in turn, 
had to choose between initiating reconciliation if the targets were breached or voting to 
adjust the targets. Although the Senate refused to accept this new requirement, the 
President put it into effect by executive order.7° 
This procedure affects the incentives associated with entitlements and reconciliation 
only at the margin. The targets at issue are the same estimates for entitlement spending 
growth regularly reported to 0MB and Congress. By adding another report gauging 
the expansion of entitlement spending, this requirement merely documents what is 
already well known, i.e., that entitlements are programmed for growth. It will be 
important only if that growth exceeds expectations, which is unlikely. The review 
process is a saddle for a horse that is already out of the barn. 
Budget Reforms in 1995: Preaching to the Choir 
Congress considered a number of measures in 1995 that would alter the manner in 
which it addresses major categories of spending, but none of them became law. More 
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importantly, most of them targeted discretionary programs, where spending control 
does not appear to be a problem. For example, the House passed a series of measures 
in 1995, the effect of which (had the Senate agreed-which it did not) would have 
been to further constrain discretionary spending. A "lockbox" provision allowed mem-
bers to amend appropriation bills so as to "lock up" approved cuts, i.e., convert the 
cuts to deficit reduction, rather than allowing reductions in one appropriations bill to 
be spent in another. A change to the baseline for discretionary spending eliminated the 
traditional adjustment for inflation displayed in congressional budget documents used 
to determine annual adjustments. A third bill prohibited the attachment of unrelated 
measures to emergency appropriations measures. 
In 1996, Congress approved, and President Clinton signed, a bill providing the 
functional equivalent of a line item veto. This new authority, significantly enhancing 
the President's leverage on rescissions, will be available to reduce selected items in all 
discretionary spending programs beginning January 1997. While the bill also allows 
the President to rescind spending for entitlement programs, it only applies to new or 
expanded entitlements, a problem already addressed by PA YGO. 
SUMMARY AND SPECULATIONS 
With the exception of the 1996 reconciliation bill targeting welfare, few meaningful 
reforms affecting entitlements and the budget have been adopted to date. The welfare 
reform bill is significant less for its contribution to deficit reduction than for the 
statement it makes about entitlement policy. It represents a tactical retreat from the 
concept of entitlement. Where PA YGO demands only deficit neutrality and protects 
existing entitlements, the welfare reform bill requires deficit reduction from existing 
welfare entitlement programs. 
For the most part, Congress has continued to rely upon reconciliation to restrain 
entitlement spending as part of its deficit reduction policies. However, the employment 
of reconciliation over the past sixteen years, culminating in the ambitious and unsuc-
cessful 1995 bill and the partial welfare entitlement rollback in 1996, has changed in 
several respects and certain limits may have been revealed. 
The timeliness of reconciliation remains a problem. Reconciliation bills covering 
five or more years, multiple programs and large budgetary savings are inherently 
difficult to complete within a single budget year. Divided government adds further 
difficulty and delay. The perception that the political pain of spending cuts must be 
spread widely within the reconciliation bill to insure its passage accounts for one 
element of this expansion. In 1995, this factor was compounded by the need to find 
enough savings to completely eliminate the deficit, compelling the most comprehen-
sive reconciliation bill in congressional history. It 1s worth noting that of the broad and 
ambitious agenda of entitlement and tax cuts reflected in the budget resolutions during 
the 104th Congress, only one major bill became law. That bill targeted a single rela-
tively unpopular set of entitlement programs (welfare) and generated a modest $9 
billion per year in deficit reduction.71 
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The logic of ever-expanding reconciliation bills explains their extension into discre-
tionary spending control. The spending caps established in the BEA of 1990 (itself 
enacted through reconciliation), extended in 1993 and attempted again in 1995, were 
put in place through reconciliation bills.72 The caps made a major contribution-a total 
of 28 percent-to deficit reduction in 1990 and 1993, primarily by banking the peace 
dividend. Their contribution in the 1995 bill-15 percent-was much less significant. 
This may be the case in future reconciliation bills as well, given the difficulty of 
finding further major savings in this portion of the budget. The distinction of the 1995 
caps lies in their shift in the target for cuts, from defense to domestic discretionary 
spending. 
The i,ntegrity of reconciliation bills has somewhat improved, especially as regards 
spending reduction. In the 1990s, fewer measures that increase spending were added. 
On the revenue side, however, the sitQation is more complicated. Most reconciliation 
bills complemented spending ~uts with tax increases to lower the deficit. But tax 
policy was somewhat fractured, as tax cuts enacted outside the budget process offset 
some of the deficit reduction achieved through reconciliation. While tax policy was 
unified in the 1995 reconciliation bill, that policy-the $245 billion tax cut-contra-
dicted the objective of reconciliation, i.e., deficit reduction. The result was a fractured 
fiscal policy. 
The veto of the ambitious reconciliation bill of 1995 and the failure to complete the 
reconciliation process directed in the 1996 budget resolution suggest that Congress 
may have overreached. Agreement could not be forced on all the changes needed to 
undo a quarter century of deficit financing into a single bill and put into law within a 
single year. It is one thing to follow Willie Sutton's advice and tackle entitlements to 
reduce the deficit. It is another thing to overhaul welfare, both of the major federal 
health care programs, and the agricultural subsidy system while simultaneously mak-
ing major tax reductions. A single reconciliation bill or even three separate bills com-
pleted in a single year may be incapable of carrying this kind of fiscal freight, and the 
policy implications it entails, to the end of the line. President Clinton's veto reminds us 
that budget reconciliation cannot substitute for policy reconciliation. 
How then are the major entitlements to be reformed to reduce spending if not 
through reconciliation? To this question there are no simple answers. Summitry is not 
a suitable candidate, because it is biased towards spending and revenue aggregates 
rather than policy. It does, however, engage both Congress and the executive branch 
on these aggregates, which must occur sooner or later if legislation is to succeed. 
Summitry may contribute by resolving a limited number of residual issues served up 
by other, more deliberative processes. The mixed history of national or blue ribbon 
commissions, e.g., the National Economic Commission of 1988-89 and the Bipartisan 
Commission on Entitlement a,nd Tax Reform of 1994, inspires little confidence, but 
could be tried again. 
Allocating major portions of the time and energy of a Congress to a problem such as 
health care reform is worth another try as well, the 1994 experience with health care 
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notwithstanding. Devoting a single Congress to reform of a single major entitlement 
program might produce smaller but more focused reconciliation bills with a greater 
likelihood of passage. This occurred unintentionally in the 1996 welfare reform bill. 
Four Congresses working over an eight-year period would be sufficient. The agenda 
would include only the four large and rapidly growing entitlements: Medicare, Medic-
aid, Social Security and federal retirement, which make up 80 percent of the total. The 
idea would be to develop consensus on the separate critical components of entitlement 
spending, one piece at a time. 
A rolling, multi-year approach to reconciliation and entitlement reform has many 
and obvious liabilities. For example, it begs the critical question of how much each 
reform initiative would contribute to deficit reduction and how one Congress might 
bind another. It would also sacrifice some of the political legitimacy and discipline 
associated with single-shot, single-year deficit reduction through reconciliation, i.e.; it 
would become pension reform or health care reform rather than balancing the budget. 
Finally, elections are cle;rly part of the answer, and several may be needed to 
develop the electoral support needed for major entitlement reform. Whether imple-
mented piecemeal or through sweeping measures such as the 1995 bill, campaigns and 
elections are critical. Elected officials, one observer noted, cannot perform "fiscal 
surgery without the patient's permission."73 This assumes, somewhat heroically, that 
the primacy of deficit reduction and the fiscal, equity and generational implications of 
entitlement programs will be part of the campaigns. 
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